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he U.S. economy is doing exceptionally
well this year, with low inﬂation and
an average unemployment rate of only
5 percent.  Economic growth continues 
to be robust in this seventh year of the
current expansion, which started in April
1991.  Since that time, the economy has
created 14 million new jobs, and inﬂation
has been comparatively low and stable.  In
the ﬁrst nine months of 1997, inﬂation in
the Consumer Price Index was running at
an annual rate of only 1.8 percent, which
is as close to a stable price environment 
as we have seen in decades.  Private-sector
forecasts, however, indicate that inﬂation,
as measured by the CPI, is expected to
return to its trend level of roughly 3 
percent in the next year.
High employment today means that
many workers are acquiring skills and
experience that will yield beneﬁts for the
rest of their careers.  But the best thing
about the current economic good news is
that it has not been created by artiﬁcial
demands stemming from excessive money
creation.  On the contrary, the low money
growth and low inﬂation of the current
expansion mean that long-term prospects
are not being jeopardized for the sake of
today’s prosperity.
In response to such good news, some
observers—especially those prone to hyper-
bole—have proclaimed a “new economic
paradigm” in which the U.S. economy has
become both recession-proof and inﬂation-
proof.  In this view, policymakers need not
worry about demand or inﬂation because
markets will keep growth strong and inﬂa-
tion in check.  However, history suggests
caution with respect to such Panglossian
notions that “all is for the best in this best
of all possible worlds.”
We must not ignore the lessons of 
the past by adopting inﬂationary policies
that have consistently culminated in
slowed growth and higher unemploy-
ment.  The fact is that, throughout history,
efforts to use expansionary monetary
policy to squeeze more real growth out 
of the economy than can be sustained 
have always led to increases in the 
misery index.  What is the misery index?
It is the sum of the inﬂation, unemploy-
ment, and long-term interest rates.  This
index was at an all-time high in the early
1980s, when each of these three rates
soared into the double digits.  By compar-
ison, the index is very low today, regis-
tering less than half the “misery” of the
early 1980s.
The purpose of this article is to
address the following issues: why low 
and stable inﬂation has been good for 
economic growth, how inﬂation uncer-
tainty hurts our economy, and what 
steps the Fed can take to make its price
stability policies credible.  The appro-
priate monetary policy response to today’s
environment of comparatively low inﬂa-
tion, low unemployment, and low interest
rates is to nurture it with a credible com-
mitment to price stability—an inﬂation
rate so close to zero that it ceases to be a
signiﬁcant factor in long-term planning.
Only in this way can the Fed reconcile
its potentially conﬂicting statutory objec-
tives of “maximum employment, stable
prices, and moderate long-term interest
rates” and realize its ultimate goal of a
rising U.S. standard of living.  Let me
begin by considering the ﬁrst issue I 
posed earlier.
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1 The U.S. Treasury’s issuance 
of inﬂation-indexed bonds,
which began in January 1997,
is intended in part to help 
distinguish changes in real
interest rates from changes 
in expected inﬂation, but 
substantial imprecision persists.
Campbell and Shiller (1996)
provide an international
appraisal of indexed bonds 
in practice. 
2 See Dewald (1986) and
Feldstein (1996) for discussion
of how inﬂation distorts saving
and investment.
3 Diebold, Rudebusch, and Sichel
(1993) evaluate evidence that
the age of an expansion does
not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the
probability of the onset of
recession.
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WHY HAS LOW INFLATION
BEEN GOOD FOR THE
ECONOMY?  
Under the successful disinﬂation poli-
cies of the past 15 years, the U.S. economy
has enjoyed its most cyclically stable period
ever.  Since 1982, the economy has had pos-
itive growth in all but three quarters out 
of 59.  By comparison, between 1969 and
1982, when inﬂation was trending upward,
there were 20 recessionary quarters out of
56.  The current stable growth experience is
the best evidence that the Fed’s choice to
ﬁght the double-digit inﬂation of the late
1970s and early 1980s has been good for
the economy.  Even though we have not yet
achieved price stability as I’ve deﬁned it, the
current 3 percent inﬂation trend is the best
record we’ve had since the early 1960s.
Let me brieﬂy review the basic argu-
ments as to why low inﬂation is good for
the economy.  First, a stable price back-
drop enables the price system to work
more efﬁciently than it would with high
and variable inﬂation.  By “working 
efﬁciently,” I mean that the economy is 
not wasting resources.  When the general 
level of prices is comparatively stable,
decision makers can interpret changes in
dollar prices as accurate signals on which
to base decisions.  In free economies, clear,
reliable signals from prices help people make
the choices that are best for them.  Interest
rates, for example, represent one of the
most fundamental prices in the economy—
the rental price of capital—and the real
interest rate is a central factor in savings
and investment decisions.  But market
interest rates transmit fuzzier signals about
the required real rate of interest in an inﬂa-
tionary climate, because observed nominal
interest rates also respond to shifts in inﬂa-
tion expectations.1 Accordingly, the deci-
sions of savers and investors are distorted
in an inﬂationary monetary regime.  
Thus, the best way to keep price signals
clear is to keep inﬂation low and, in
principle, eliminate it.
Second, inﬂation distorts decisions
because it is a hidden tax on the private
sector borne by holders of money and 
government securities.  Even at today’s 3
percent inﬂation trend, the real value of a
dollar is cut in half in less than 25 years.
Although the government admittedly has
to collect taxes, the inﬂation tax generates
incentives for wasteful efforts to reduce
money holdings, like currency, which
depreciate through inﬂation.  Inﬂation 
also distorts decisions to save and invest,
since inﬂation-compensating interest pay-
ments and inﬂation-induced capital gains
are counted as taxable income.  The tax 
on the portion of interest payments that 
is intended to adjust for inﬂation inadver-
tently enlarges the wedge between the
value of the interest paid by the bor-
rower and the after-tax value of interest
received by the lender.2 In the case of 
capital gains, signiﬁcant tax burdens can
fall on transactions that have not generated
any real income—for example, when an
asset is sold at a price that has increased
only at the rate of inﬂation.  These inﬂa-
tion-induced tax distortions decrease 
planned savings and interfere with 
capital formation.  
The best way to attenuate the inﬂation 
tax is to keep inﬂation low and, in principle,
eliminate it.
Third, recent business-cycle research
suggests that a stable, non-inﬂationary 
environment, rather than one in which
monetary policy is directed at ﬁne-tuning
real growth, may be the best contribution
monetary policy can make toward sus-
taining real growth.  Behind the premise 
of ﬁne-tuning lies the notion of a trade-
off between inﬂation variability and
output variability—the idea that higher
inﬂation can buy more real growth in 
the short run.  Contemporary thinking,
however, says that inﬂationary variability
threatens, rather than prolongs, economic
expansions.  Recessions are often the
product of particular inﬂationary imbal-
ances, instead of expansions that have
simply “run out of steam.”3 An example
of an inﬂationary imbalance from the 
mid-1980s is the excessive investment 
in commercial real estate that eventually
depressed the market, taking years to
unwind.FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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4Kandel, Ofer, and Sarig 
(1996) and Chan (1994) 
ﬁnd evidence of an inﬂation-risk
premium in interest rates.
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Because inﬂation has been shown to be
more volatile at higher levels, the best way to
reduce its variability is to keep inﬂation low
and, in principle, eliminate it.
In general, U.S. monetary policy has
succeeded in capturing many of these 
beneﬁts of low inﬂation during the past 
15 years.  I would further argue that this
success has not been an accident but,
instead, a deliberate policy choice.  The
policy shift since the early 1980s to a 
low-inﬂation regime has required a com-
mensurate reduction in the rate of mon-
etary expansion.  Growth in the M2 
aggregate averaged more than 9 percent
from 1968 to 1983, but less than half as
much—4.4 percent—from 1984 to 1997.
This experience demonstrates that the
Federal Reserve can restrain excessive
money growth and bring down the
inﬂation rate.  Inﬂation control is undeni-
ably the Fed’s responsibility because it
alone has the tools to determine the long-
run rate of monetary expansion needed to
keep inﬂation low.  Even though the inﬂa-
tion rate so far this year is running at less
than a 2 percent rate, there remains a good
deal of uncertainty as to whether inﬂation
is down for the count.  Until price stability
becomes the explicit, publicly recognized,
and sole objective of monetary policy, a
degree of inﬂation uncertainty is bound to
persist.  Let me now turn to the second of
my three questions.
WHY IS INFLATION
UNCERTAINTY BAD FOR 
THE ECONOMY? 
In addition to expected inﬂation,
inﬂation uncertainty  increases nominal
interest rates because lenders demand
compensation for the risk they take 
that inﬂation might end up higher than
expected.4 The inﬂation-risk premium,
which effectively raises real borrowing
costs, arises in policy regimes where credi-
bility is imperfect.  What happens is that
lenders judge that future inﬂation will
almost certainly not be much less than
expected, but could quite possibly be 
considerably more than expected.  This
asymmetry often results when inﬂation 
has fallen to a low level at which lenders
and borrowers agree that inﬂation has a
greater likelihood of a substantial increase
than decrease.  In such an environment, 
market interest rates adjust to compensate
lenders for facing these asymmetric risks.
As a market response to uncertainty, the
inﬂation-risk premium resembles other risk
premiums that help people hedge against
risk.  Whereas other risk premiums
respond to risks that are intrinsic to the
nature of the investment, the inﬂation-risk
premium hedges against an unnecessary
risk uncertainty surrounding the value of
the money that will be used to repay the
debt.  Only a non-inﬂationary monetary
regime can eradicate this unnecessary 
inﬂation risk and thereby deliver the 
lowest sustainable real borrowing costs 
to stimulate capital formation and foster
future growth.
International evidence suggests that
investors often require substantial inﬂation-
risk premiums.  After they have been burned
by inﬂation once, investors typically need to
see years of consistently low inﬂation to con-
vince them that the risk of inﬂation has sub-
sided.  For the past several years, almost all
major  industrial countries have had inﬂa-
tion rates well below 5 percent.  Yet the real
borrowing costs on government securities
differ widely across countries because of 
the substantial inﬂation-risk premiums in
countries that have a long history of inﬂa-
tion.  Indeed, the prospect of reducing the
inﬂation-risk premium in their interest 
rates strongly motivates Italy, Portugal, and
Spain, for example, to join the European
Monetary Union.
Much of the inﬂation-risk premium 
in interest rates stems from the experience
that once inﬂation is unleashed, the process
of bringing it back down is long and painful.
As a consequence, it is even more important
for the Fed to convince the public of its
intentions to contain inﬂation. Reductions
in the inﬂation-risk premium are possible if
the Fed follows a disciplined and credible
policy to move inﬂation lower and keep it
that way.  This brings me to the last of my
three questions.FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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5Walsh (1996) discusses recent
monetary policy practice in
New Zealand.
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HOW CAN THE FED 
MAKE PRICE STABILITY
POLICIES CREDIBLE?   
The persistence of inﬂation-risk pre-
miums in nominal interest rates—even
with inﬂation as low as it has been in
recent years—is an indication of imperfect
inﬂation credibility.  A policy is credible
when it can be counted on.  And a credible
non-inﬂationary monetary policy is one
that can be counted on to keep inﬂation
low.  Credibility is an essential element 
of a price stability policy for the simple
reason that only when people have faith 
in price stability can the full range of 
beneﬁts begin to accrue.  Otherwise,
interest rates will remain elevated by 
an inﬂation-risk premium.
New Zealand is one country that had a
history of high inﬂation in which the central
bank appears to have rapidly acquired credi-
bility for its new, low-inﬂation policies.5
There, a legislative mandate calling for price
stability through inﬂation targets has con-
vinced investors that the country’s imperfect
past inﬂation record is not likely to recur.
Without this newly created credibility—
even with low current inﬂation—long-term
interest rates in New Zealand could easily
be 3 or 4 percentage points higher than
they are.  By achieving a degree of cred-
ibility through inﬂation targets and a
legislative mandate that makes price
stability the monetary policy objective,
New Zealand has been able to reduce real
borrowing costs substantially.
I am concerned, however, that in the
United States, 3 percent inﬂation has
become too entrenched in people’s expec-
tations.  One argument against a move to
lower inﬂation is that, because of these
entrenched expectations, the transition
would be too disruptive.  Indeed, a sur-
prise attack on inﬂation could well lead to 
a regrettable loss in output.  A sound way 
to change these entrenched expectations
would be to adopt an approach similar 
to that of New Zealand and several other
countries.  This approach involves setting 
a precise inﬂation goal and a timetable for
achieving it.  At the semiannual congres-
sional hearings on monetary policy, the Fed
could announce a set of multiyear inﬂation
targets, which would then deﬁne a course by
which inﬂation could gradually be reduced.
Correspondingly, policy actions would be
geared both to place inﬂation within that
year’s target range and to set the stage for the
following year’s target.  In short, when inﬂa-
tion is too high—and I think even 3 percent
is too high—a speciﬁc inﬂation target and
stated timetable would make it easy to see 
if policymakers were in fact carrying out
their responsibilities.
I would argue that announced policy
objectives in the form of inﬂation targets
would enhance the Fed’s credibility, because
its policy actions would be easier to inter-
pret.  In such an environment, preemptive
policy actions against inﬂationary pressures
could be readily understood for what they
are.  If, on the one hand, people believed
that the Fed were merely acting at an early
stage to head off inﬂationary imbalances,
they would understand that the economy
was not in immediate danger of either a
recession or a burst of inﬂation.  If, on the
other hand, the Fed had poor credibility and
poorly understood reasons for acting, the
public might believe that the Fed acts only
when panicked, and they might therefore
interpret any Fed action as cause for alarm.
CONCLUSION
I have emphasized that “price stability”
is a state that must be sustained, and con-
sidered sustainable, over time.  Although
CPI inﬂation has been running at just 1.8
percent so far this year, longer-term expec-
tations are for roughly 3 percent a year,
and there is always a risk that inﬂation
could run higher.  What really matters is
not merely the absence of inﬂation at any
given point in time, but the widespread
presence of public expectations that prices
will remain stable in the future.  I believe
the best way for the Fed to achieve price
stability is to announce multiyear inﬂation
targets, paving the way for private plans,
contracts, and Fed policies to reinforce
each other.  In this way, price stability 
represents a compact with the AmericanFEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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people that, if upheld, could achieve lower
interest rates, eliminate the deadweight
costs of inﬂation, and remove inﬂationary
imbalances as a cause of economic down-
turns.  For its part, the Federal Reserve 
can best contribute to this compact by 
conﬁrming that it is following a price sta-
bility policy by announcing speciﬁc inﬂa-
tion targets and a timetable for meeting
them.  A legislative mandate along these
lines would further strengthen the
compact.
I do not think the excellent perfor-
mance of the U.S. economy during the cur-
rent economic expansion is just a chance
occurrence.  The low-inﬂation environment
has been an important contributing factor,
and the public should give monetary policies
that have restrained excessive money
growth their due credit for contributing to
current economic good times.  The public
should also recognize that the Fed’s single-
minded pursuit of price stability is the best
way it can contribute to an economic envi-
ronment of sustained growth and a rising
standard of living.  
Indeed, my conclusion is that the best
policy for economic growth is to keep inﬂation
low and, in principle, eliminate it.
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